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Abstract 
This paper sets out theory and measurement of how intangible investment might capture 
innovation and what data on intangibles looks like for the EU, Japan and the US.  We also 
look at complementarities between ICT and intangibles, spillovers from intangibles to growth 
and policy implications.  
 
                                                          
 
*Contact: Jonathan Haskel, Imperial College Business School, Imperial College, London SW7 2AZ, 
j.haskel@imperial.ac.uk.  This paper is prepared for Oxford Review of Economic Policy. This draft is 
based heavily on a longer paper “Intangible Capital and Growth in Advanced Economies:  
Measurement Methods and Comparative Results”, available along with all data used here at 
www.intan-invest.net. That paper discusses many of the details briefly dealt with here: this paper has 
updated US results and adds results for Japan.  We are very grateful for comments to Steve Nickell, and 
an anonymous referee and participants at an OxRep meeting in December 2012.  We are grateful for 
financial support from the EU FP7 in developing previous versions of these data and to Kyoji Fukao 
and Tsutomu Miyagawa for kindly supplying the Japanese data.  Errors are our own. 
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1 Introduction  
Everyone seems to think Europe needs some innovation.  Innovation to improve a broken 
financial system, innovation to shore up the Eurozone, innovation to boost economic growth.  
So we have a profusion of agencies, indices and think tanks competing to offer ideas.  The 
UK produces an innovation index.
1
  The EU an innovation scoreboard.
2
  The OECD an 
innovation strategy.
3
 
 
But what exactly is innovation?  How is it measured?  What policy works and what should be 
discarded?  Among this melee of activity, there seems surprisingly little agreement.  The 
Lisbon strategy set the EU a target of 3% of EU GDP to be spent on R&D by 2010.  When 
this was missed, the target was downgraded to an aspiration.  Should policy-makers upgrade 
the target?  Act on universities?  Immigration?  Improve the internet?  Perhaps vested 
interests are drowning out the good advice of academics.  Or perhaps the academic 
community is still not settled on what it wants to say.  
 
This paper starts in section 2 by reviewing a number of different approaches to innovation.  In 
section 3 its sets out an integrating framework to understand them all.  Sections 4-6 
implements just one approach, based on intangible assets and sets out just what we know 
about intangible investment, innovation and competitiveness in the EU.  It uses the latest 
comparable data for Europe, US and Japan, freely available at www.intan-invest.net and 
suggests how this work might be built upon to answer these difficult questions.  A longer 
discussion of many of the issues herein may be found in Corrado, Haskel, Jona-Lasinio and 
Iommi (CHJI, 2012). 
 
2 A preview: the many approaches to innovation 
In this section we document at least four broad approaches to measuring innovation and show 
they seem to indicate very different cross-country rankings.  We offer a way to interpret them 
in section 3.
4
  
 
                                                          
 
1
 http://www.nesta.org.uk/areas_of_work/economic_growth/the_innovation_index.   
2
  http://www.proinno-europe.eu/EIS2008/website/docs/EIS_2008_Final_report.pdf.  
3
 http://www.oecd.org/innovation/strategy 
4
 Other comparisons can be found in Jensen and Webster (2009) and OECD (2010). 
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2.1 Innovation output indicators  
There are two main approaches here.  First, innovation surveys. Eurostat mandates all 
signatory countries to survey businesses asking them to self-report how innovative they are on 
the Community Innovation Survey.
5
  A typical question on the survey is, for example, “Over 
the last three years, did this business introduce (a) new or significantly improved goods?  (b) 
new or significantly improved services? (this wording is taken from the UK survey).
6
  A 
second approach is to use indicators such as patents, trademarks or copyright as an indicator 
of innovation output.  Other indicators are items such as published scientific articles. 
 
Figure 1 sets out a measure of innovation from innovation surveys, namely the -weighted 
percentage of service sector companies answering “yes” to the question of whether they 
introduce a new significantly improved product or process innovation over the three years 
2006-8.  The most innovative countries according to this measure are Spain and Iceland.  
Only 9% of US companies replied yes to this question: Japan and Chile are the least 
innovative (in manufacturing, the typical number is 15%, Ireland and USA are at the top, 
Germany and Japan at the bottom).   
 
Figure 1. comparative innovation data from cross-country innovation surveys 
 
 
Source: US data: Boroush (2010), Other:  OECD (2010), p.26  
 
                                                          
 
5
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/cis.  Some UK results on this are in 
http://www.dius.gov.uk/innovation/innovation_nation/~/media/publications/2/21390%20AIR%20Repo
rt%20AW%20Complete.  
6
 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/docs/c/cis6-2006-2008-questionnaire.pdf 
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Figure 2 sets out the authorship of the most cited 1% of published scientific articles, 2006-
2008.  The innovation leaders here seem to be the US, UK and Germany, with Iceland and 
Ireland (who are very high in Figure 1) lagging. 
 
Figure 2 Authorship of the most cited 1% of published scientific articles, 2006-2008, for 
OECD countries 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Measuring Innovation, 2010, dx.doi.org/10.1787/836087047406 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Innovation Inputs 
The main approach here is R&D spend, which is measured in many countries more or less 
according to standard accounting rules: typically summing wages of R&D workers and their 
use of materials and capital (such as laboratories).  The latest SNA (2008) mandates countries 
to capitalise R&D in their national accounts, which will lead to an explicit R&D account. 
 
Figure 3 sets out business investment in R&D as a share of GDP, a measure that puts Israel, 
Finland, Sweden, Korea and Japan at the top, and Poland, Mexico, Greece and Chile at the 
bottom. 
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Figure 3: Business investment in R&D as a share of GDP, 2009, OECD countries  
 
 
 
Source: OECD STI Scoreboard, June 2011, Figure 2.7.1  
2.3 Innovation inputs and outputs combined: the EU scoreboard method  
This method is a kind of multiple indicators method  exemplified in the multi-year, multi-
country EU innovation scoreboard.
7
  It is a weighted average of 24 indicators for each EU 
country, with the indicators ranging from GDP, R&D spend, ICT spend, exports of high 
technology products and broadband penetration.   
 
Figure 4 sets out these data.  The most innovative countries Sweden, Denmark, Germany and 
Finland, with Latvia at the bottom.   
 
Figure 4: EU innovation scorecard, 2011 
                                                          
 
7
  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius-2011_en.pdf 
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Note: Average performance is measured using a composite indicator building on data for 24 indicators 
going from a lowest possible performance of 0 to a maximum possible performance of 1. Average 
performance in 2011 reflects performance in 2009/2010 due to a lag in data availability. 
Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard, 2011,  
 
 
2.4 Growth accounting: outputs net of inputs.  
The above methods cover innovation (a) outputs; (b) inputs; or (c) inputs and outputs.  A final 
method employed by many economists is outputs net of inputs, namely multi-factor 
productivity.
8
   
 
Figure 5 sets out multi-factor productivity growth (excluding the intangible assets that we 
shall detail below) for a series of countries, 1995-06, with Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Sweden uppermost, and Greece, Italy and Spain at the bottom.  
  
                                                          
 
8
 To those unfamiliar with the term, the essence of the method is described by Jorgenson (2007).  To 
understand innovation, he argues, start by asking this: how can an economy grow with no innovation?  
It can just add more inputs: airlines use more planes, McDonalds employ more burger flippers, movie 
companies hire more actors.  This is duplication of physical or human capital.  Innovation is using 
more ideas i.e. more knowledge capital.  So innovation is that part of growth due to using more ideas.  
Using more ideas is hard to measure, but using more physical capital and machines is easier to 
measure, and so economists measure innovation as a residual.  That is, growth due to ideas is growth 
net of duplication, or the part of output growth (if any) over and above increased use of physical capital 
and/or people. 
7 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Multi-factor productivity growth, 1996-06, selected OECD countries.  
 
Source: OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2011, Figure 1.7.  
 
 
 
  
3 Understanding these approaches: an integrating framework 
These approaches come up with very different country rankings.  How can we better 
understand this?  This section sets out a simple model which (a) integrates the various 
approaches to innovation set out above and (b) further integrates innovation into the national 
accounts to make it measureable.   
 
3.1 Production relations and factor payments 
Consider a simplified economy with just two industries/sectors (this model is based on 
Corrado, Hulten, Sichel, (2005, 2009), and is set out in more detail in Corrado, Haskel, 
Goodridge, 2011).  
(a) an “innovation” or “upstream” sector.  This sector produces new finished ideas i.e. 
it commercializes knowledge.  
(b) a “production” or “downstream” sector”. This sector uses the knowledge to 
produce final output.
9
 
 
                                                          
 
9
 By “final” output we mean output for sale to consumers or for export or investment (that is, for 
simplicity this sector does not produce intermediate output).   
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
Multi-factor productivity growth, 
1995-06 
8 
 
 
Assume the following.  First, the upstream sector uses ideas for free, e.g. from universities.  It 
then produces “finished” ideas or commercial knowledge: think of a blueprint, which and can 
be licensed to users.  Let the commercialised knowledge have an asset value P
N
N and the per 
period licensing fee users must pay to use the knowledge be PrR (so for example, buying a 
patent outright costs P
N
N, whereas renting the knowledge stock R embodied in it costs P
R
R 
per year).   This implicitly assumes that the upstream sector can, at least for some period, 
appropriate returns to its knowledge, and so this model is identical to Romer (1990) (where 
patent-protected knowledge is sold at a monopoly price to the final output sector during the 
period of appropriability). 
 
The downstream sector does not produce ideas, but rather consumption and investment goods 
whose value is given by
Y C I
t t t
P Y P C P I  .  We assume however that the downstream 
sector pays for ideas from the upstream sector to effect this production.  The downstream 
sector is assumed a price-taker for knowledge; by contrast the upstream sector has market 
power e.g. a patent on knowledge.  
 
With these assumptions in hand, we are in a position to write down the production functions 
and factor payment equations for the two sectors, they are written as follows: 
 
 ( , , , );  ( )
N N N N N N L N K N
t t t t t t t t t t
N F L K R t P N P L P K    (1) 
And  
 ( ,  ,  ,  );     
Y Y Y Y Y Y L Y K Y R Y
t t t t t t t t t t t t
Y F L K R t P Y P L P K P R     (2) 
 
On the left of these equations are the production functions describing how inputs are 
transformed into outputs.   The production functions have three factors of production, stocks 
of labour ( )L , stocks of capital ( )K , and stocks of knowledge ( )R , superscripted by N  or 
Y  depending on sector of usage.  The term t captures anything that shifts the production 
function but is not paid for e.g. free knowledge or inspiration.  On the right of these 
expressions are the factor payment equations that describe the payments to the factors of 
production.  In the factor payment equations, 
L
P and 
K
P are competitive factor prices for 
services supplied, per unit of labour and capital input, respectively
 
 
 
In the upstream factor payments equation, there are no payments to basic knowledge, i.e. 
P
R
R
N
 does not appear, because its services are assumed free, from universities say, and 
determined outside the model.  The parameter 1 measures upstream market power, the 
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“innovator” markup over competitive factor costs of inputs used up in the innovation process.  
By contrast, in the downstream payments equation, the downstream sector pays to use the 
knowledge stock.  Thus it “rents” two capital stocks: the physical capital stock and the 
knowledge capital stock, for which it pays rental payments P
K
K
Y
 and P
R
R
Y
 respectively.  Of 
course, the downstream sector might in addition be using some ideas that it does not pay for. 
These will not show up in any factor payments, but rather are “costless” shifts in the 
production function t
Y
.  A similar interpretation holds for t
N 
in the upstream production 
function.
 10
  
 
The stock of commercial knowledge ( )
Y
R is the accumulated output of upstream production 
( )N
, and grows via the perpetual inventory relation: 
 
 
1
(1 )
Y R Y
t t t
R N R

    (3) 
where the term R is the rate of decay of appropriable revenues from the existing stock of 
commercial knowledge.  An analogous equation determines the stock of physical capita  
 
 
1
(1 )
Y K Y
t t t
K I K

    (4) 
 
The depreciation of knowledge R, is discussed in the case of private R&D by Pakes and 
Schankerman (1984).  As they point out, the deprecation of physical capital K is well 
established and is commonly thought physical decay: that is, a fall in the physical ability of 
tangible capital to render capital services due to wear and tear.  It is then sometimes asked 
how such a concept can be applied to intangible capital, given that it is unlikely to wear out.  
However, this is not the right interpretation of the term.  What is required is a measure of how 
the value of the usable stock of intangible capital varies over time and it can fall for at least 
two reasons (a) because new ideas are invented that make old ones obsolescent (or ideas 
partially “leave” the firm if there are partially embodied in departing workers) and (b) because 
it might become increasingly difficult for firms to appropriate benefits from knowledge as e.g. 
knowledge leaks out to competitors (e.g. via patent expiry).   Both these considerations might 
                                                          
 
10
 Corrado, Goodridge and Haskel (2011) discuss how these assumptions can be relaxed.  One might 
also have the upstream sector paying for ideas from universities which would involve another rental 
term in the upstream equation.  Another way to think of the model is to imagine the upstream sector as 
a platform producer, who then sells versions of ideas downstream (e.g. Microsoft produces Office and 
then sells successive versions downstream).   
10 
 
 
make one think that knowledge decays very fast, the polar opposite of the “wear and tear” 
idea that it does not decay at all.
11
  For further discussion see below. 
12
 
 
3.2 Value added, growth and innovation predicted by the model 
 
Real value added in the whole economy, Q, is the sum of the outputs of the two sectors, 
which we denote P
Q
Q with real growth rate dlnQ, which are given by  
 
 
T otal Investm ent
ln ln (1 ) ln ,
Q Y N C I N
Y
Y Y Y
Q Q Q Q
P Q P Y P N P C P I P N
P Y
d Q s d Y s d N s
P Q
    
   
 (5) 
 
What is the intuition for the top equation in (5)?  GDP includes a broad concept of 
investment, here P
N
N.  The reason can be thought of by analogy to tangible long-lived goods.  
Suppose an aircraft factory buys in aluminium and produces both final output and its own 
machines.  Then its value added should be properly treated as both the final aeroplanes and 
the machines i.e. one might think of the factory as consisting of both an aircraft factory and 
also a machine factory.  Now suppose the factory also writes its own long-lived software to 
run the machines.  Then we should think of it as both an aircraft factory and machine factory 
and also a software factory, which is what (5) says. 
 
                                                          
 
11
 This view suggests too that  varies according to (1) aggregation (e.g. it might be relatively fast for a 
firm,. but slower for an industry) (2) producer (e.g. it might be zero for the public sector if they are 
producing basic research not exposed to the competitive process that might make it obsolete) and (3) 
technology.   
12
 For completeness, in the downstream factor payments equation, PR is the price of renting a unit of 
the finished knowledge stock (e.g., a license fee for a patent or blueprint or product version).  The 
Jorgenson (1963) user cost expression gives the relationship between P
N
, the price of a unit of newly 
produced finished knowledge (an investment or asset price), and its unit rental price: P
R
, 
( )
R N R R
t t t t
P P r    
, where t
r
is the net rate of return common to all capital in year t (taxes are 
ignored) and 
R
t

is the expected capital gain (loss) on intangible capital, i.e., the expected rate of 
change of 
N
P .  The model is completed by an analogous asset price equations for physical capital 
namely 
( )
K I K K
t t t t
P P r    
.   
 
 
11 
 
 
Aggregating value added inputs across the sectors yields an expression for the sources of 
growth in value added output as, where sQ is the share of nominal value added accounted for 
by payments to the particular factor: 
 
 ln ln ln ln lnL K R
Q Q Q
d Q s d L s d K s d R d TFP     (6) 
where ;   ;   and .
Y N Y N Y
L L L K K K R R     and dlnTFP is defined as the growth in Q 
over and above the growth contributions of L, K and R (which are in turn their growth rates, 
times their factor payment shares in total value added).  The use of factor shares assumes that 
factors are paid their marginal product so that =1 in the upstream sector although the 
approach can be modified to account for market power (or scale economies) as in Hall (1988).  
The model written above with u>1 then is a modification that allows only innovators to have 
market power. 
 
 
3.3 Understanding the different approaches 
Consider (6).  This says that value added growth is due in part to growth in L and K.  This 
formalises the idea that growth can be achieved by duplication i.e. adding more labour and 
physical capital.
13
  It further says that growth can be due to the increased use of paid for ideas, 
dlnR, but they have to be paid for to be used, and hence make a contribution to dlnQ of sQ
R
 
dlnR.  The final term, dlnTFP is the growth impact of everything else, which in this model 
can only be free ideas used in both sectors (and is in fact a Domar-weighted average of dlnt
Y
 
and dlnt
N
).  Thus in this model, innovation in the sense of use of ideas is also growth net of K 
and L usage, i.e.   
 
  ln ln ln ln lnR L KQ Q QInnovation s d R d TFP d Q s d L s d K      (7) 
 
This then helps understand the sources-of-growth/outputs net of inputs approach. What of the 
other approaches?   
 
                                                          
 
13
 In this discussion we abstract from the fact that some part of technical advance is embodied in 
equipment, or that capital stocks measured in constant quality terms count “better” machines or 
airplanes as “more” machines or airplanes. 
12 
 
 
First, surveying firms to ask how innovative they are could in principle get at some of the 
elements of (7).  Recall that firms are asked if their products and services are “new or 
significantly improved”.  This could perfectly well capture dlnQ: output of a new drug for 
example.  A well-known issue however is that much depends on how firms understand 
“significantly” (is the iPhone 5 “significantly” improved?).  Much too depends on how firms 
think of their new capital equipment when answering the questionnaire.  In (7) an airline 
buying new planes is not innovation (i.e. dlnK is subtracted out), since the new plane is likely 
innovation in the aircraft industry and so we don’t want to double count it.14   
 
To look at how firms treat new capital equipment in answering the questionnaires, Crespi et al 
(2007) analysed the text replies for a certain UK Community Innovation Survey year where 
firms were asked to fill in a text description of their “innovations”.  Many of the replies 
described an innovation as being the deployment of a new machine (indeed, this tallies with 
the time series observation that reported innovation rose very strongly during the ICT 
spending boom of the late 1990s).  All this suggests that in innovation questionnaires, firms 
might be reporting on both dlnQ and also dlnK, which is not what (7) requires and runs the 
risk of double counting if innovation is counted by the firm producing the new capital and the 
firm installing it.  So, innovation questionnaires may be hard to compare between firms at a 
point in time (if they interpret “significantly” differently) and hard to compare over time (if 
innovation includes capital spending which is very cyclical).   
 
Second, what of R&D surveys, that measure wage and capital costs of R&D activities?  They 
are invaluable measures of the upstream innovation process, (1).  More work is needed 
however to find out the effect on growth.  When R&D is capitalised into national accounts, as 
it will be in future years, this effort will be easier but at the moment it is left to the analyst.  It 
is of course worth noting that counting P
L
L
N 
 and P
K
K
N 
leave open how to estimate .  In 
addition, there may be other knowledge investment besides R&D. 
 
Patents represent of course a potentially very powerful measure of output of the innovation 
sector (for a very early and prescient discussion, see Kuznets, 1962).  In this framework, 
innovative output N is weighted by its price.  In practice the patent price is very rarely 
observed and so citation-weighted patents (the vast majority of patents are never cited) are 
                                                          
 
14
 Thus if we survey the airline industry and they ordered 5 new innovative planes, we subtract off their 
dlnK (planes) and ascribe any innovation in airlines only to what airlines do net of this new capital e.g. 
ticketless boarding, faster turnaround of planes.  If we survey the aircraft industry and find they 
produced innovative planes from a very small rise in the number of machines we subtract off their 
small dlnK (machines) and so correctly ascribe innovation to the aircraft industry. 
13 
 
 
used.  In addition, patent citations enable knowledge flows to be traced rather than leaving 
them, as here to the residual.  As is well acknowledged however, patents do not cover all 
innovations/knowledge investment (in the UK for example software cannot be patented).  As 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002, p.3) say “There are, of course, important limitations to the use of 
patent data, the most glaring being the fact that not all inventions are patented”.  An important 
recent addition therefore to this line of work is the use of trademarks which might be a 
complementary use of IP to patents or another indicator of novelty (see e.g. Greenhalgh and 
Rodgers, 2010 for a review and the work in Baroncelli, Fink, and Javorcik, (2005), Gotsch 
and Hipp (2012) and Jensen and Webster (2009).   
 
In sum, patents are a vital source of important information in areas that the accounting 
framework does not cover; how much the findings can be generalised to unpatented 
innovations is yet to be established. 
 
Finally, it will be apparent that the scoreboard mix output and inputs does not sit at all well 
with the framework here.  Indeed, the essence of this approach is to carefully distinguish 
between output and inputs.  A mix of the two might convey some sense of total activity in the 
economies concerned but not much else.  In addition, the scoreboard method suffers from the 
significant problem of not knowing how to weight the different activities (how does one 
compare broadband in Italy with the numbers of graduates in the UK?), whereas the weights 
in this method come directly from market prices (that in turn form the shares, s) so that 
markets signal relative valuations of different factors. 
3.4 The strengths and weaknesses of the intangible/growth accounting approach 
to innovation 
So the TFP approach does have some advantages.  First, it is based on a logically consistent 
framework, which, as we argue below, will help guide measurement of its various parts.  
Second, it is integrated with national accounts concepts such as GDP, investment etc. and so 
can bridge the discussion from innovation to familiar and well-established measures.  Third, 
some insight on policy can be gained since the framework lends itself to quantifying 
spillovers (Griliches, 1988).   
 
There are many disadvantages however.  First, the framework places a very heavy burden on 
measurement.  Since dlnTFP leaves no economic footprint, that is, no price or quantity (e.g. 
how could you measure the price of quantity of information learned over the internet?), it is 
measured in practice as a residual from (7).  Thus mismeasurement of other terms will “land” 
into dlnTFP.   
14 
 
 
 
Second, this framework cannot be readily implemented using current data.   At present, much 
knowledge investment is not counted as investment in the national accounts, but rather as an 
intermediate (see below for which is and is not counted).  For purposes of demonstration 
assume that no knowledge investment is counted.  Thus value added growth will be counted 
as dlnY and not dlnQ and the following growth accounting relation will hold 
 
 ln ln ln ln
L K B
Y Y
d Y s d L s d K d TFP    (8) 
where the s terms are shares in P
Y
Y.  So, comparing (8) with (7) we see that  
a. The output term is dlnY and not dlnQ 
b. The input terms leave out dlnR 
c. The share terms are shares of PYY ( not PQQ). 
Thus the observed dlnTFP is different.   
 
The two expressions would of course be the same if all knowledge were for free, i.e. the 
innovation sector provides free commercialise ideas.   Put another way, if one calculated the 
sY
K
 in (8) residually, (i.e. by sY
K
 =1- sY
L
) and innovation was not free, it would look like the 
share of K was very large suggesting large profits accruing to physical capital, whereas this 
might just reflect that such returns also have to cover payments to knowledge capital as 
well.
15
  
 
Many innovation studies have attempted to distinguish between innovation and diffusion, the 
latter being the spread of new ideas.  Questionnaires often attempt to get at this, by asking 
firms to identify whether their innovation is “new” to the market or country.  
Patents/trademarks are an attempt to measure innovation since they are supposed to be for 
something genuinely novel.  One very difficult issue in this work is the definition of what is 
really novel – is for example an iPad novel, or a combination of previously discovered 
elements such as a touchscreen and software?  The intangible/growth accounting approach 
embodied in equation (7) instead focuses on investment.  So in the iPad case, any spending on 
new knowledge to develop it is investment as long as it is long-lived.  .  If the ideas come for 
free, they are, in this framework, counted in TFP growth.  So the part of innovation measured 
by sRlnR is investment in commercialising new ideas and that part measured by lnTFP 
might be regarded as the diffusion of free ideas.    
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 So for example Domowitz, Hubbard and Peterson (1986), use industry data to calculate price cost 
margins as sales less payroll less material costs (as a proportion of sales, with an inventory adjustment).   
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4 Measuring investment in innovation  
To adopt this approach to innovation then the model suggests we start with measuring 
intangible investment, P
N
N.  Thus we need (a) a list of intangible assets to be measured and 
(b) P
N
N for each asset type.  (In the next section we consider building stocks). 
 
4.1 Asset types to be measured 
The first task is to identify all relevant intangible asset types.  R&D has been thought of as a 
knowledge investment for a long time.  Software was included as an investment in National 
Accounts about a decade ago.  What other knowledge investments might there be?  CHS 
(2005) choose a list of assets which they grouped in terms of three broad categories: 
computerized information, innovative property and economic competencies.  They populated 
these categories with nine asset types, with the resulting list similar to that used by, e.g., 
competition agencies when valuing assets for a company under scrutiny, or tax guides for 
reporting the value of financial assets following a corporate merger or acquisition 
16
.  Table 1 
shows their list and, in column 1, the National Accounts conventions regarding the assets (see 
text below for columns 2 and 3).   
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 For example, the UK Competition Commission inquiry on the provision of Home Credit valued: (a) 
corporate reputation/brand (b) the trained workforce (c) the customer base (d) and IT systems and 
development.  (For details on methods, see the commission’s report Home Credit Inquiry, 2006, 
Appendix 3-6 and 3-8).  And the US tax code specifies 12 intangible assets to be valued and listed as 
financial assets following a merger or acquisitions, including the value of the business information 
base, the workforce in place, know-how (listed along with patents and designs), and customer and 
supplier bases. (See US IRS Publication 535, Business Expenses, pp. 28-31).  
16 
 
 
 
Table 1: CHS intangible assets, national accounts conventions 
 
Asset
Intang included in Nat 
Accounts?
Capitalization 
Factor Depreciation rate
Computerised Information
Purchased Software Yes 1 0.315
Own-Account Software Yes 1 0.315
Databases See note 1 0.315
Innovative property
R&D Satellite for some 1 0.15
Design No 0.5 0.2
Mineral Exploration Yes 1 0.075
Financial Innovation No 1 0.2
Artistic originals
EU yes; JA/US no; see 
note asset-specific asset-specific
Economic Competencies
Advertising No 0.6 0.55
Marketing research No 0.6 0.55
Own-Account Organisational Capital No 1 0.4
Purchased Organisational Capital No 0.8 0.4
Training No 1 0.4
 
Note: SNA 1993 recommended capitalization of databases.  US BEA plans to include entertainment and artistic 
originals and R&D as investment in 2013.  Capitalisation factors convert data on total spending to investment 
Source: Goodridge, Haskel, Wallis, 2012 and CHJI, 2012.  The assets set out are of those of CHS, with the 
addition of details on artistic originals, which is based on the work of Goodridge and Haskel (2011).  
 
Let us review the assets in Table 1.  “Computerized information” includes both purchased and 
own-account software and illustrates an important point in gathering data on intangibles, 
namely that much of it is likely generated “in-house”.  Databases are also included.  SNA 
1993 recommended capitalizing investments in databases but as a practical matter the issue 
remains unresolved: national accountants tend to take the view that investments in databases 
are captured in current software measures.
17
  This asset will likely grow in importance with 
the increased interest in “Big Data”.   
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 The Handbook on Deriving Capital Measures of Intellectual Property Products (OECD 2010, p. 
120ff) reports that a survey of OECD member countries found that, of the 13 countries who responded 
to the survey, 8 said that they capitalized databases in principle, but that the values were not separately 
identifiable (OECD 2004). 
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The second and third broad groups are “innovative property” and “economic competencies”.  
“Innovative Property” is designed to capture a range of assets that may have intellectual 
property protection associated with them.  “Economic competencies” tries to capture a range 
of knowledge assets that firms invest to run their businesses, but that might have no IP.   
 
These two categories then attempt to capture all other costs of developing and launching new 
products and services, including for example market research (usually excluded from R&D
18
). 
The basic idea was to include (1) the non-technological costs of design (industrial and 
nonindustrial) and services innovation (including investments by financial services firms not 
captured by R&D surveys), (2) the costs of marketing and launching new products, including 
ongoing investments to maintain the value of a brand, and (3) organization and human capital 
management innovations.  Given the huge interest at the time in financial services the CHS 
list included a special category for them. 
 
Artistic originals were included since they are investment in knowledge assets such as books, 
movies, TV, theatre etc.  These are treated as investment in some national accounts systems 
but not all.   
 
4.2 Nominal investment flows 
Having settled upon a list, one then has to match this with data at hand for such spending.  
This is taken up in detail in CHJI (2012), but to see some of the issues consider software.  
Purchased assets are generally measured via investment surveys, so when software was 
capitalized, the existing tangible investment surveys (of machinery, vehicles, buildings etc.) 
were expanded to include software.  This then measures P
N
 N in (1).   
 
However, much software is produced in house (banks for example write a lot of their own 
software) and since it is not sold on a market, there is no recorded P
N
 N.  Equation (1) then 
suggests that one tries to measure the labour and capital costs and apply a mark-up.  But since 
none of these data existed, in the first published estimates for software investment in the UK, 
own-account software spending was assumed equal to a multiple of purchased. .  In a 
subsequent work, own-account software investment was measured using information on 
employment and wages in software engineering occupations.  In terms of (1) then, this was 
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 Practice in the EU and US diverges a bit in this regard.  In the United States, all forms of social, 
market, demographic, and actuarial research, as well as artificial intelligence, management science, and 
geophysical research were explicitly excluded from the expenditures collected by R&D surveys until 
2008.  The basis shifted in that year to the same basis used for R&D in company reports, but an 
instruction to exclude market research remains. 
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data on P
L
L
N
.  A number of decisions then have to be made.  First, without data on P
K
K
N
 or µ, 
some assumption has to be made.  Second, not all software workers might be writing new 
long-lasting software, some might be performing user service and routine maintenance 
(Chamberlin, Chesson, Clayton and Farooqui, 2006).  Thus observed P
L
L
N
 has to be adjusted, 
a capitalization factor that converts all spending on knowledge to investment (i.e. spending on 
long-lasting knowledge). 
 
This basic approach to measuring P
N
N was implemented by CHS in their attempt to measure 
P
N
N in other intangible assets (and was for the business sector given the measurement 
problems in the public sector).
 19
  As above, it used a range of surveys and occupational data.  
In most cases  was assumed to be one.  When occupational data was unavailable a multiple 
of purchased was assumed.  Purchased organizational capital was assumed to correspond to 
spending on management consulting and own-account set to 20% of senior managerial wages 
(i.e. based on P
L
L in (8)).  Capitalization factors are set out in Table 1 above, second column, 
those for advertising and management consulting set below 1.  Artistic original spending 
varies by, for example, whether TV production is for news (assumed short-lived) or TV films 
(assumed long-lived).  Further research is clearly needed to improve these assumptions.  CHJI 
(2012) attempt to harmonize methods across countries and amend the existing financial 
innovation measure. 
20
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 The pioneering work on Japan (Fukao et al. 2009) disaggregated according to manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing.  Since the emergence of the Japanese work, researchers in other countries have also 
experimented with disaggregate sector and industry-level estimates of intangibles.e.g., Barnes (2010) 
and Dal Borgo, Goodridge, Haskel and Pesole (2011). INTAN-Invest industry data are under 
development and will be available in the near future.. 
20
 The measurement of each asset is set out in CHJI(2012).  Software, artistic originals, mineral 
prospecting and R&D are all from official statistics.  Other data are based on (8).   Design and market 
research are based on purchases from the input/output tables.  Advertising is based on final P
N
N 
spending.  Bought in organisational capital is a P
N
N measure based on sales of management consulting 
services and purchased is assumed at 20% of senior management salaries.  For training, we include 
both apprenticeship and vocational training.  For financial innovation, we follow Hunt (2008) who 
argued that most of the cost of innovation in the financial service sector consists of compensation of 
researchers.   In related work for the United States, Corrado and Hao (unpublished) identified a group 
of occupations they called “quantitative finance” occupations that they added to STEM occupations to 
arrive at an estimate of employment and compensation of workers in financial services whose work 
activities touched on analytical problem-solving and/or innovation.  We therefore assumed that 8 
percent of compensation of high skilled workers is a good approximation for the innovation investment 
in financial industry: a share that mirrors the Corrado and Hao results for the US.   
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5 Measuring knowledge capital stocks 
 
Before undertaking growth accounting, the capital stocks must be built, following (3).  To do 
this, the P
N
N data needs to be deflated to obtain N and then built into a stock using (3).  This 
requires values of the prices P
N
 and depreciation rates N which are discussed in the remainder 
of this section. Readers wishing to skip the details can go to section 6. 
 
5.1 The price of knowledge 
Intangible investment in real terms—obtaining each Nj —is a particular challenge because 
units of knowledge cannot be readily defined.  Although price deflators for certain intangibles 
(software, mineral exploration, and artistic originals) are found in the national accounts of 
many countries, generally speaking, output price measures for intangibles have escaped the 
statistical net.  Thus, other than software and mineral exploration for which deflators are 
included in the U.S. national accounts, CHS used the overall business output price as the price 
index for intangible investment and this is the method followed in many papers.  
 
One area where this can potentially be improved is the emerging work on price measures for 
R&D.  The U.S. BEA offered an R&D-specific output price in its preliminary R&D satellite 
account (Moylan and Robbins 2007; Copeland, Medeiros, and Robbins 2007).  A contrasting 
approach is in a recent paper by Corrado, Goodridge and Haskel (2011), which casts the 
calculation of a price deflator for R&D in terms of estimating its contribution to productivity.  
Applying their method to the United Kingdom yielded a price deflator for R&D that fell at an 
average rate of 7-1/2 percent per year from 1995 to 2005—and thus implied that real UK 
R&D rose 12 percent annually over the same period.  This stands in sharp contrast to the 
science policy practice of using the GDP deflator to calculate real R&D (the UK GDP 
deflator rose 3-3/4 percent per year in the comparable period), and the results of applying the 
BEA method to the UK data (the UK BEA-style deflator rises 2.1 percent per year). 
 
Regarding software, the EUKLEMS project harmonized hardware prices (to quality-adjusted 
US price indexes) but did not harmonize software prices.  Since software investment is 
around three times that of hardware, this is potentially important.  In CHJI (2012) we devise a 
harmonized software index using US quality-adjusted pre-packaged data and taking up the 
recommendations of the Handbook on Deriving Capital Measures for IP Products (OECD 
2010) which recommends using a productivity-adjusted cost measure for own-account 
software and a quality-adjusted measure for pre-packaged and custom software.   
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5.2 The “depreciation” of knowledge 
As mentioned above, the model uses the perpetual inventory model (PIM), to calculate net 
stock estimates for intangible capital (R).  In that model, economic depreciation captures two 
distinct processes, discards and economic decay.  A discard arises if, for example, the 
commercial value of an idea falls due to competition from another one, or a worker leaves the 
firm with at least some of the firm’s knowledge.  The probability that a given asset type will 
survive in productive use from one period to the next is thus summarized by a stochastic 
discard, or survival, function.   
 
The productivity of an asset as it ages, conditional on its survival from one period to the next, 
is described by a decay function.  A decay age-price profile can be highly concave (i.e., in the 
case of, say, certain training investments shown to have long-lasting effects for employees 
who remain with the investing employer.  But when a decay function implying long-lasting 
productivity conditional on survival is interacted with a discard function with a high early 
failure rate and age cohorts are aggregated, the end result is a convex geometric-like profile 
that can be summarized using a relatively fast rate of geometric depreciation in the PIM 
(Hulten and Wyckoff 1981, Schreyer (2001).
21
 
 
Although relatively little is known about depreciation rates for intangible assets, the foregoing 
discussion implies that their depreciation rates are relatively fast, mainly because of a high 
rate of “discards” even with little decay (that is productivity of the assets conditional on their 
continued ownership by, or survival in, the investing firm is long-lasting).  On the basis of 
this thinking CHS set rather high values for , especially for the asset types in economic 
competencies.  For example, despite the well-documented fact that advertising campaigns 
may have long-lasting impacts on a firm’s sales and profits, the depreciation rate for brand 
equity was set to be very fast to account for the fact that some investments in brand result in a 
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 Oulton and Srinivasn (2003) for example define the real net capital stock of asset i at time t, K i,t , as 
 ,  
where INi,t is nominal investment in asset i at time t .  Nominal investment is converted to constant 
quality real investment by dividing by a quality-adjusted investment price index p
A
 for the new asset at 
time t.  F describes “discard” or “survival” as the share of assets from time t still in service in each 
period (i.e., if it equals 1 or 0, all or none of the assets are still in existence).  is the relative 
marginal product of the investment of age  to the marginal product of a new machine, and so captures 
“economic decay” as a physical quantity concept.  Thus a design for example, might exhibit no 
“economic decay” (that is never “wear out” in a quantity sense), but might be “discarded” as, for 
example, fashions change.  The depreciation rate  in the PIM captures the net effect of both these 
terms. 
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competitor’s loss of market share and therefore fail to survive as an asset of the industry or 
sector.  For training and organizational capital, the depreciation rate was set lower than 
investments in brand to reflect the fact that the average tenure of employees in the United 
States is between 4 and 5 years.  Indeed, average employee tenure could be used to set the 
service life of employer-provided training, and the depreciation rate for employer-provided 
training could vary across countries, and, in principle, across time. 
 
Since the CHS study, evidence on service lives of intangible assets has accumulated from two 
main sources.  First, the U.S. BEA, for example, places its central estimate of the depreciation 
rate for R&D at .15. Soloveichik (2010) produced depreciation estimates for four categories  
of total artistic originals that also implied rather long service lives.  The OECD Handbook on 
Intellectual Property reviewed national accounting practices on certain intangible assets 
(software, entertainment and artistic originals, mineral exploration) and states that artistic 
originals have a 5-10 year lifetime with at least a double-declining balance, implying a 
geometric rate of depreciation near to CHS. 
 
Direct estimates of life lengths from surveys are a second source of new evidence.  Surveys 
conducted by the Israeli Statistical Bureau (Peleg 2008a, 2008b) and by Awano et al. (2010) 
with the UK Office of National Statistics.  These surveys ask about the “life length” of 
investments in R&D (by detailed industry in Israel) and intangible assets (R&D plus 5 other 
asset types in the UK).  The Israeli survey supports lengthening the service life for R&D, 
while the UK survey confirms that the very fast depreciation rates CHS assumed for 
economic competencies are about right.  As a result in www.intan-invest.net we use 
depreciation rates set out in the final column of Table 1 where the rate for mineral exploration 
is the US BEA rate.
22
  The others are as discussed above or the same as CHS, bar R&D which 
is 15%. 
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 The lifetime of the knowledge created by mineral exploration is the service life of the discovery (a 
well or a mine).  In the Australian national accounts, a service life of 34 years is used whereas the 
United States uses 12 for oil and gas exploration and 20 for mining.  Most U.S. exploration is for oil 
and gas, and a 12-year life is used for the calculations reported in this paper. Note that investment is 
mineral exploration is negligible for most EU countries. 
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6 Some conceptual issues 
 
Finally, two other conceptual issues.  First, when analyzing the conduct of R&D in private 
business, by industry or in the aggregate, the productivity literature and science policy 
analysis has tended to focus on the performer series.  However, in the BEA R&D satellite 
account, for example, a strong argument for using the funder series, so that, for example, 
government-funded defence R&D performed in the private sector is treated as public not 
private assets, in line with how asset ownership is treated in National Accounts.  The current 
treatment regards this form of R&D as producing tacit knowledge in the private sector that 
depreciates like other such knowledge, and treats the government payments as an addition 
to private capital compensation i.e. a kind of subsidy.  See CHJI (2012) for more 
discussion. 
 
Second, it is sometimes argued that investment in intangible capital asset X is ultimately 
investment in human capital.  Thus one is “double counting” with human capital.   This is not 
the case.  Consider organizational capital, in particular, the internal processes by which a 
company, say Apple, manages its global supply chain.  Although such knowledge may be 
created and applied by managers within Apple, even when those managers leave the firm, 
Apple retains a good part if not all of that knowledge.  Of course that knowledge may decay 
in competitive value for other reasons (as the market power is temporary a la the model of 
section 1 and footnote 5).  But the point is that the knowledge involved is, once again, a 
payment to the intangible capital of a firm (Apple) and not simply a dimension of human 
capital as conventionally defined.  
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7 Harmonized estimates  
We produce harmonized time series of intangible investment for the EU27 member countries 
and Norway and the US in 1995-2005, and for the EU15 economies, the US plus Czech 
Republic and Slovenia we add the years  2006-2009. We include agriculture but exclude 
rental real estate, which EUKLEMS (2008, and O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009) also omits 
from its definition of the market sector due to measurement difficulties.
23
   
 
7.1 Results on intangible investment 
The updated evidence on intangible investment by the market sector in the EU15 area and in 
its main groups of member countries from 2005 to 2009 is shown in Figure 6.  As previously 
found (Jona-Lasinio et al. 2011; see also van Ark et al. 2009), the EU15 shows a lower 
propensity to invest in intangibles than does the United States. The rates for the U.S., 
however, are essentially the same as those for the UK, whose propensity to invest in 
intangibles is the highest in Europe, and like the United States, invests more in intangibles 
than it does in tangibles.  
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 The market sector in EUKLEMS is NACE sectors A through K (excl. real estate) plus sectors O and 
P. We exclude sector P (private households) and work with NACE sectors A through K (excl, real 
estate) plus sector O. 
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To understand a bit of the dynamics that underlie these cross country differences, the percent 
change in tangible and intangible investment GDP shares from 1995 to 2007 is shown in the 
Figure 7a and b.  The rate of intangible investment in all EU15 regions increased from 1995 
to 2007 while the rate of tangible investment fell or remained about flat (The Mediterranean 
region is an exception, however.).  In the Anglo Saxon countries (an  
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aggregate dominated by the UK), the slowdown in tangible investment is especially 
pronounced and is comparable to the US.  
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The more recent data show that the rate of tangible investment in the EU15 declined sharply 
from 2007 to 2009 while the rate of intangible investment remained about flat.  In the US, 
intangible investment fell.  Across Europe there are small differences by regions, and 
intangible investment relative to tangibles held up better in recent years on both continents.  
All told, the shift to intangible investment from 1995 to 2009 is a striking trend.  
 
7.2 Effects on growth  
Table 2 sets out our sources-of-growth analysis for 14 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom plus Japan and the United States.  We choose the years 1995-
2007 (the 2007-09 recession years raise a set of other issues).  
 
The first result from table 2 is the finding originally reported in CHS, that once intangibles 
have been capitalized, capital deepening (column 2) becomes the dominant source of growth 
(see the memo items, column 2), being 65.4 percent for the EU (on a weighted average basis), 
58.4 percent for the United States, and 42.9 percent for Japan.  For the United States, where 
we have a relatively long time-series (on a EU comparability basis, from 1977 to 2010), the 
fraction for the sub-period in table 1 is essentially the same as the fraction for the entire 
period (58.9 percent).  That finding would, of course, not necessarily hold for other countries, 
nor for that matter, for U.S. experience in earlier time periods, but it is useful to note 
nonetheless. 
 
The second point is that advanced countries differ in interesting ways.   Looking at the memo 
items, the weighted average EU results suggest that the 65.4 percent contribution of capital 
deepening to labor productivity growth consists of 41.6 percent tangible and 23.8 percent 
intangible capital deepening, whereas 19.0 percent of the growth in labor productivity is due 
to MFP.  The unweighted averages are 34.3, 23.0 and 26.2 percent, respectively.  The 
unweighted/weighted differences suggest that smaller EU countries rely more on MFP and 
less on tangible capital deepening.  Thus we have the following comparative picture.  First, 
relative to Japan and the US, capital deepening in the EU accounts for a greater fraction of 
labor productivity growth, mainly as a result of a higher contribution from tangible capital 
deepening.  With regard to intangible capital deepening, its relative importance in explaining 
labor productivity growth is greatest in the United States and smallest in Japan.  Second, in 
the EU as a whole the rest of growth is split more or less equally between labour composition 
and MFP, whereas the US relies much more on TFP growth and Japan very much more on 
improvements in labor quality.  
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Table 2.  Contributions to the growth of output per hour in fourteen EU countries, Japan, 
and the United States, 1995 to 2007 
  
Labor 
productivity 
growth 
Contribution of components: 
 
Total 
Capital 
Deepening 
  Labor 
Composition 
Multifactor 
productivity 
  
Tangibles Intangibles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Austria 2.4 0.8 .3 .5 .2 1.4 
Belgium 1.8 0.7 .2 .5 .1 1.0 
Czech Rep 4.2 2.4 1.9 .5 .3 1.5 
Denmark 1.4 1.2 .7 .5 .2 -.1 
Finland 3.8  .9 .2 .7 .2 2.7 
France 1.9 1.0 .4 .6 .4  .5 
Germany 1.7 1.0 .7 .3 .0  .8 
Ireland 3.8 1.4 .8 .6 .1 2.2 
Italy  .6  .7 .5 .2 .2 -.4 
Netherlands 2.3  .9 .4 .5 .4 1.0 
Slovenia 5.3 1.7 1.2 .5 .7 2.9 
Spain  .8 1.0 .7 .3 .5 -.6 
Sweden 3.7 1.9 1.1 .8 .3 1.5 
UK  2.9 1.5 .8 .7 .4 1.1 
Japan 2.1  .9 .7 .2 .8  .5 
United States 2.8 1.6 .7 .9 .2 1.0 
Memos  Average percent contribution of component: 
EU (GDP 
weight avg)   65.4 41.6 23.8 14.8 19.0 
EU (unweight 
avg) 
 
57.3 34.3 23.0 15.5 26.3 
Japan  42.9 33.3  9.5 38.1 23.8 
US   58.4 26.8 31.9  7.2 35.7 
Source:  For EU countries and the United States, authors’ calculations based on intangible 
investment databases developed by the authors and/or partners in previous works.  See text for 
further discussion.  For Japan, Fukao, Hisa, and Miyagawa (2012). 
Note—For individual countries, figures in column (1) are annual percent changes, and figures in 
columns (2) through (6) are percentage points.  In the memo panel, column 2 is the fraction of 
column 1 accounted for by column 2, and columns 3 to 6 are the fraction of column 1 that these 
columns account for.   In the memo panel, weights are by the country share of nominal GDP, 1995-
2007.  
 
 
Within intangible capital deepening, figure 8 shows significant differences in the deployment 
of intangibles by broad type for a sample of countries.  For example, the US and UK rely 
more on economic competencies, relative to Finland who shows a greater contribution of 
intellectual property, substantially driven by R&D.  
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Note to figure: SFT=software, IP=innovative property, EC=economic competencies (see 
Table 1 for definitions of each category). 
 
8 Complementarities and spillovers 
 
In this section, we use the data to examine: (a) complementarities between factors of 
production (b) spillovers. 
 
8.1 Complementarities 
It has been suggested that intangible assets are assumed to complement ICT capital so that to 
realize the potential benefits of computerization, investments in additional assets such as new 
organizational processes and more trained workers are necessary. This mechanism is implicit 
in, for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), who argue that the productivity gains from 
installing ICT hardware (tangible capital) would only be reaped with organisational change 
(which in our terms is installing intangible capital).  Many other studies analyzed the 
complementary relation between ICT and other types of intangible assets (R&D, skills 
training and human capital, brand equity) and suggest productivity growth is higher once the 
complementary role of intangibles is accounted for (see Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan, 
2004, for a discussion and references).  
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Finland France Germany Italy Netherla
nds
UK US
SFT 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.20 0.22
IP 0.36 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.35
EC 0.17 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.34 0.33
Figure 8. Contribution of Subcomponents 
of Intangibles to 
Labor Productivity Growth (1995-2007) 
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Figure 9 lends some support to the complementarity hypothesis showing a broadly upward 
sloping relation between intangible (non-ICT capital) and ICT capital deepening.   
 
Figure 9: Contributions of ICT and intangible capital deepening, 1995-07, USA and 12 EU 
countries  
 
Note to figure: ICT capital is defined as computers, communications equipment and software and intangible 
capital is economic competencies and innovative property.  Contribution is share-weighted change in capital stock.  
 
8.2 Spillovers 
Turning to spillovers, evidence on tangible capital inputs does not reveal any particularly 
strong evidence for spillovers due to e.g. plant, buildings and computer hardware (Stiroh, 
2002, offers a survey including an earlier literature on equipment investment; an exception 
here is communications capital, see Corrado, 2011, which likely has network effects).  
Existing evidence on intangible capital is mostly focused on R&D, and seems to suggest 
spillover effects, see e.g. Griliches (1998). Spillovers from intangible capital seem a natural 
hypothesis to the extent that such capital is likely to have public good characteristics. On the 
other hand, spillovers might not occur if intangible capital is protected by intellectual property 
rules (copyright, trademarks etc.) or tacit knowledge (internal knowledge of supply chain 
management for example).   
 
Spillovers from asset X implies that the elasticity of dlnK
X
 on dlnY exceeds its factor share.  
Thus the test of a spillover is whether there is any relation between dlnK
X
 and dlnTFP (since 
dlnTFP measures the elasticity at the factor share by construction).  So, figure 10 plots MFP 
growth by country against tangible capital deepening contribution and shows no clear 
relation. By contrast, figure 11 shows MFP growth against intangible capital deepening 
contribution, and does appear to show a relation.  This is suggestive of spillovers from 
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intangible capital, and more extensive regression estimates suggest this to be the case 
(Corrado, Haskel and Jona-Lasinio, 2012).  
 
Figure 10: MFP growth and tangible capital deepening contribution, 1995-07, USA, Japan 
and 12 EU countries  
 
Source: Table 2 
 
Figure 11: MFP growth and intangible capital deepening contribution, 1995-07, USA, Japan 
and 12 EU countries 
 
 
Source: Table 2.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
We have set out an approach to innovation measurement and policy, based on intangible 
investment.  We have attempted to distinguish between productivity growth and innovation 
the latter being made up of investment in the commercialization of new ideas and the use of 
free ideas.  We have implemented the approach by producing harmonized estimates of 
intangible capital for Europe and the US.  The new growth accounting results are the broadest 
available results for Europe to date.   
 
Drawing this together we have the following.  First, the UK, like the US now has more 
intangible investment than tangible investment, and other EU countries are following.  That is 
to say, future investment will look much more intangible than tangible.  Second, this 
investment is important for growth.  In the US, capital deepening is 65% of growth and 
intangible investment is now 50% of capital deepening.  EU countries will be catching up to 
this level.   
 
Third, is there any role for policy to affect such intangible spending?  The arguments over 
private R&D spillovers are well-known and support for spillovers from public R&D projects 
is to be found in e.g. Haskel and Wallis (2010) and Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2008).  
This paper suggests there are possible spillover indications that are wider than just R&D.  All 
this suggests that in the future the factors that enable economies to invest in information and 
monetise new knowledge and discoveries will be key enablers of growth.  So, for example, IP 
policy is likely to be of increasing importance along with broadband/communications 
equipment.  Hargreaves (2011) contains a set of regulatory proposals for IP policy and 
Corrado (2011) shows the importance of the communications infrastructure. 
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